This briefing is the third in a series on the EU-Mercosur agreement, where BLOMSTEIN addresses key provisions with respect to Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Public Procurement, Competition and Sustainability, and outlines implications and opportunities for businesses.

In this release, we focus on the Agreement’s core provisions related to Trade in Services, particularly the commitments framework, national treatment and limitations. In 2023, the EU exported €28.5 billion in services to Mercosur, while Mercosur’s service exports to the EU amounted to €13.1 billion. The Agreement is expected to significantly boost this bilateral exchange. For the EU in particular, the agreement presents expanded opportunities in strategic sectors such as business services, financial services, telecommunications, maritime transport, and postal and courier services.

Amid escalating global trade tensions, the European Union (EU) faces significant challenges as U.S. President Donald Trump announced new tariffs impacting EU exports and sending shockwaves to the capital markets. A 20% tariff on all EU imports starting April 5, 2025 were introduced. These measures are claimed to reduce the U.S. trade deficit and bolster domestic manufacturing. As an affected company, you can check this list of exempted products not subject to the 20% additional tariffs. However, please be aware that some of these products are subject to their own tariffs, such as the 25% tariff on imported automobiles and automobile parts.

Two months after the European Commission published its Competitiveness Compass, we take a deeper look into its strategic vision to enhance the EU’s economic resilience and global competitiveness (following up on our first overview), namely the competition law aspects. The Commission is rather clear that it seeks to establish Europe’s competitiveness as the new “North Star”. However, what is not so clear: Through which paths will the Commission lead us on our journey to this North Star?

On the third anniversary of Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has once again tightened its sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus. The most important amendments concern Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the Russia Regulation) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (the Belarus Regulation). The respective amending Regulation (EU) 2025/395 and Regulation (EU) 2025/392 introduce additional and largely parallel restrictions on Russia and Belarus. While the extension of sanctions against the Russian “shadow fleet” or the import ban on Russian aluminium was already reported in the press, the sanctions package includes additional measures that deserve closer attention. We detail the most important aspects of these changes below.

Up until this point, there has been a strong emphasis on collaboration and unison for the EU and U.S. sanctions issued to address Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. Now, while U.S. sanctions will not disappear overnight, there appears to be some increasing daylight in the approaches taken by the U.S. versus the EU, chiefly due to the new Trump administration’s dramatic shift in foreign policy and diplomacy. We provide highlights of the changed dynamics and potential trajectory for U.S. sanctions with respect to Russia below.

Reporting obligations under foreign trade law often place substantial bureaucratic burdens on companies and individuals. The changes and clarifications that took effect on 1 January 2025 are therefore particularly welcome: for instance, reporting thresholds have been significantly raised and reporting deadlines harmonised. In addition, the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung – AWV) now explicitly stipulates that the transfer of crypto assets constitutes a reportable payment once the thresholds are met; moreover, new classification numbers for crypto assets have been introduced. We provide a summary of the key changes.

In our series of briefings, we highlight some of the key issues of International Investment Law (IIL). In this fourth edition, we focus on the complex relationship between IIL and foreign direct investment (FDI) screening laws.

Der russische Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine hat eine regelrechte Aufbruchsstimmung in der europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie (SVI) ausgelöst: Die Nachfrage nach militärischen Gütern, Dienstleistungen und Innovationen ist rasant gestiegen, und auch private Investoren richten ihren Blick verstärkt auf Unternehmen in diesem Sektor (siehe hier).

In dieser Ausgabe unserer Briefingreihe werfen wir einen genaueren Blick auf die regulatorischen Fallstricke, die bei der Beschaffung von Finanzmitteln lauern. Ein brandaktuelles Thema, das insbesondere für Start-ups und KMU angesichts der „Zeitenwende“ und eines zunehmend positiven Geschäftsklimas von Bedeutung ist. Erfahren Sie, wie Sie trotz der Vielzahl an nationalen und europäischen Vorgaben sicher durch den Regulierungsdschungel navigieren können.

In this third briefing on International Investment Law (IIL), we examine how IIL and in-vestor-state arbitration may be used in response to the so-called countersanctions adopted by the Russian government in retaliation to sanctions imposed by the EU and its Western partners.

In this second edition of BLOMSTEIN’s International Investment Law (IIL) briefing series, we look at how the EU’s sanctions against Russia are affecting existing investments in Russia and investment arbitrations against the Russian state. Meanwhile, our next briefing will look at the impact of Russia’s countersanctions on investors and their prospects for redress under IIL.

Foreign direct investments (FDI) have faced greater scrutiny in recent years, as states increasingly subject investment transactions to screening procedures due to rising geopolitical tensions and national security concerns. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the worsening climate crisis have prompted stronger and more frequent state actions. Regulatory measures and new security policies will likely impact existing and planned investments significantly. For instance, EU financial sanctions can directly affect the ability to control investments by investors subject to asset freezes and other restrictions. Russian “counter sanctions”, on the other hand, have included threats of expropriation to Western companies, with one machine tool manufacturer already reporting that the Russian government nationalized one of its plants.